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ABSTRACT
Recent high-profile cyber-attacks affecting the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK have brought into focus the fact that data, 
devices, and people are so intermingled that we now need a new way of approaching everyday security that provides an account 
of place. The assumption until now has been that the security of the individual will follow from technical security and that de-
signing for security requires purely technological solutions. Our creative engagement method puts the human security of actors 
in the foreground, ensuring that actors who may ordinarily be marginalized may have their perspectives taken into account. The 
creative methods used include participatory physical modelling to co-design representations of what constitutes ontological 
security in the everyday for communities. LEGO and other materials allow participants to physically model matters of concern as 
tangible scenarios, using colored bricks to encode actors, infrastructure, and the movement of data. In this paper, a single LEGO 
model, depicting an internet-protocol home-banking service, is described in detail. A number of playful and agonistic interac-
tions between our participants are examined through a place-based lens, using descriptive concepts from ontological and au-
tonomous design, an approach designed to tease apart different aspects of our results. This reveals how a community constructs 
place, the perspectives and horizons of actors, and networks of resilience. We find that participants achieve positive insight into 
these scenarios by testing out the ways in which they can be broken down by antagonists and adversaries. Participants sustain a 
space of contestation in which dissensus is established and anticipation of breakdown can be played with.
Keywords: ontological design, autonomous design, ontological security, co-design, LEGO.
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Holding on to dissensus: Participatory 
interactions in security design
Introduction
Recent high-profile digital attacks like the ransom-
ware Wannacry, which affected the National Health Service 
(NHS) in the UK last year (Ehrenfield, 2017), have brought 
into focus the fact that data, devices and people are so in-
termingled that we now need a new way of approaching 
security. The traditional approach has been that technical 
computer security is paramount (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 
2009), and this is defined as ‘protection against unwanted 
disclosure, modification, or destruction of data in a system 
and also the safeguarding of systems themselves’ (CSTB, 
1991, p. 2). Since the mid-1990s the study and practice of 
computer security has been dominated by the use of sta-
tistical or mathematical risk models, with research on this 
being funded at both national UK and European levels. The 
methods described in this paper developed out of one such 
initiative, and were designed to extend current forms of en-
gagement with communities (TREsPASS, 2013-2017).
The assumption has most often been that the security 
of the individual will follow from technical security. Howev-
er, there is also a clear practical and theoretical distinction 
to be made between the security of the data that is being 
shared across an infrastructure, and the ontological secu-
rity of the actors who utilise technological services (Coles-
Kemp and Hansen, 2017). This distinction is at the heart 
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of any thorough understanding of how the security of a 
person and of a community is enmeshed with the complex 
information-sharing environment. This information-shar-
ing environment and the different levels of access to and 
control over its infrastructures, determines many of the op-
portunities available to communities throughout the world.
Current information security risk management meth-
ods do provide descriptive tools for assessing threats, most 
often through the systematic brainstorming of scenarios. 
One amongst many such approaches is to use the out-
comes of brainstorming to create ‘attack trees’ (Schneier, 
1999; ADTool, 2018; Figure 1). These are intended to show 
the steps an attacker might take to reach a goal, but the 
resulting diagrams very quickly become unwieldy, as with 
many of these approaches, with many branches and rep-
etitions of ‘leaves’ (or steps) across the tree being added. 
In today’s dynamic information-sharing landscape the pro-
cess of making these trees is too slow, and is undermined 
by the imaginative human capability to create new lines of 
attack on-the-fly, even for multiple goals to be attacked si-
multaneously (Cropley, 2010; Mandal and Lim, 2008). Since 
the dominant discourses of information security are fixated 
on its potential impact on profit (Amoore, 2013), the focus 
is most often on the defence of an institution’s assets rath-
er than on the opening up of a space to decide the question 
of ‘Security for whom?’ This focuses on supporting the pro-
duction of resilience through social practices, at either an 
organisational or community level. 
This paper presents a creative co-design process for 
exploring a more expansive form of security in which the 
intersections between technological and individual securi-
ty can be examined, and discuss the results obtained from 
these in a central case study concerning how to design 
security for a home banking system. The objective of the 
paper is to demonstrate how a dynamic and expansive ap-
proach to the design of security can be put into practice 
- through creative security engagements which are playful 
but also serious participatory research. In addition to this 
we suggest that our results can be successfully analysed 
through the lens of a number of interwoven concepts from 
democratic agonism (Mouffe, 2000, 2009), ontological 
design (Winograd and Flores, 1986) and autonomous de-
sign (Escobar, 2012, 2017), with a view to supporting di-
verse cultures and perspectives by helping to make them 
stronger in a technologically mediated world. Within this, 
a place-based modelling lens composed of the following 
three intersecting points of interest stand out as being in-
trinsically connected to participatory modelling with partic-
ular communities. This will help us to see the connection 
between physical modelling and how communities can 
protect themselves by creating a clearer picture of what 
resilience means to them.
(i)  The concept of developing place-based ontologies, 
with physical modelling, which can be used to in-
flect subsequent work to secure the kinds of rela-
tionships that exist between actors, and how this 
can include and centralise actors that might other-
wise be marginalised through the use of traditional 
approaches, such as the attack tree. 
(ii)  The perspectives and horizons of actors, and of the 
reshaping of these horizons, is a means of design-
ing technical security structures that contribute to 
resilience as defined by a community. Agonistic 
but playful interactions during physical modelling 
support the everyday life of communities, through 
the representation and discussion of everyday 
identities and perspectives emerging out of this. 
These represent what ‘constitutive difference’ is 
for a community (Staten, 1986): specifically, de-
termining who is on the ‘inside’ and who is on the 
‘outside’. This can be seen as a natural extension 
of place-based modelling. 
(iii)  Physical modelling elicits networks of resilience, 
working with a community’s natural strengths, es-
pecially where modelling shows how breakdowns 
in practices can be planned for and avoided by 
building on inherent community resilience. 
These three topics are brought into the discussion of 
our results to illustrate how they can be used to analyse 
participatory modelling. Our aim here is not to instrumen-
talise ideas from ontological design and autonomous de-
sign or to construct a rigorous framework, but to test out 
just a few points of connection between these ideas and 
conventional technical security design- in order to broad-
en the range of possibilities for supporting the resilience of 
communities of different kinds.
We hope that by describing our results in some detail, 
and by including excerpts from participant speech, that this 
will bring to life the above three areas of interest, showing 
the aptness of these concepts to the analysis of participa-
tory design and co-design data: how they have been enact-
ed by participants through the media of physical modelling 
and diagramming. We also point to the importance of con-
testation and agonism as a necessary and sometimes de-
sirable aspect of the co-design process.
Related work
Anthropologist Arturo Escobar introduces the con-
cept of ‘autonomous design’ to describe the potential of 
a traditional and marginalised community to ‘practice the 
design of itself’ (Escobar, 2017, p. 5). While the subjects of 
information security are not conventionally considered tra-
ditional or marginalised, we contend here that a creative 
approach to security considers those whose ontological 
security is threatened by cyber and physical attacks, hacks 
and other breaches: be they refugees relying on mobile 
phones or small businesses relying on micro-loans admin-
istered through IPTV (internet protocol television). In cre-
ative security, as we call it, the discourse of situated knowl-
edge and practices (Haraway, 1988) is an essential starting 
position, so that information security can be addressed in 
a non-abstracted way by considering the effects of place 
and space. 
Escobar describes autonomous design as requiring 
‘a different sort of attitude that comes from dwelling in a 
place and from a commitment to a community with which 
we engage in pragmatic activity around a shared concern, 
or around a ‘disharmony”, through ‘intense engagement 
and involved experimentation’ (Escobar, 2012, p. 36). A typ-
ical line of investigation in this approach, he says, is to ask, 
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“Why do we/I see this as a problem?’ and to follow each 
‘because...’ with another ‘why’ until participants’ values are 
made explicit’ (p. 47). Such open-ended conversations, he 
notes, ‘often go on for hours seemingly without a concrete 
agenda. Planners miss this dynamic altogether, or consider 
it inefficient or even a waste of time’ (p. 47). However, out 
of this, a ‘model’ of ‘the problem at hand’ is produced, and: 
‘The concrete result is a series of tasks, organizational de-
signs, and criteria by which to assess the performance of 
the system’ (p. 47). For the participating community, this 
creates ‘a learning system about itself’ (p. 46), where they 
design criteria that emphasize ‘place-building, relocalisa-
tion, renewed attention to materiality’ (p. 8), resulting in 
‘changes in the horizon that shapes understanding’ (Esco-
bar, 2012, p. 38).
In participatory design research, diverse shared spac-
es of contestation using artefacts are crafted, and the sta-
tus of these is debated in the literature. Binder et al promote 
the concept of ‘design things’, ‘‘things’ that gather human 
being together’ (Binder et al., 2011, p. 6). Björgvinsson de-
scribes how ‘agonistic thinging’ with a ‘polyphony of voices’ 
reveals the ways in which public spaces have been hege-
monically ‘striated’ for participants, and ask whether it is 
indeed possible to attain ‘a sustainable agonistic space’ 
(Björgvinsson et al., 2012, p. 143). Hillgren et al. note that 
spaces of ‘agonistic infrastructuring’ need to be support-
ed through ‘strategic design to ensure that the claims and 
voices of marginal actors can grow stronger’ (Hillgren et al., 
2016, p. 96-97). For DiSalvo’s GrowBot participants, ‘politics 
were actively projected onto and through artifacts’, through 
a dialogic process of ‘critical making’ that highlights the 
possibility of a public and ‘hybrid’ practice respecting the 
desired and ‘perceived politics of artifacts’ for different 
publics (DiSalvo, 2014, p. 104). This can be seen as a key 
aspect of ‘adversarial design’, ‘a condition of forever looping 
contestation’ in which objects and ‘spaces of confrontation’ 
and ‘spaces of  contest’ are provided as a resource for dem-
ocratic pluralism (DiSalvo, 2012, p. 5; 2010. p. 4). Keshavarz 
and Mazé address ‘the problematics of relating to ‘others”, 
by querying ‘the framing and staging of relations among di-
verse participants, including those with very different start-
ing points than designers’ (Keshavarz and Mazé, 2013, p. 
8). In doing so they make use of Jacque Rancière’s notion 
of ‘dissensus’, which, as they describe, ‘concerns a break in 
the sensible order, [...] in which the established framework 
of perception, thought and action is confronted with the 
‘inadmissible” (p. 11). It is via these breaks, they say, that 
the distributed ‘times/spaces of contemporary practices’ 
can be accessed. These are difficult to elicit in participatory 
design, they say, but it is around this that a ‘dissensual com-
munity’ can be established (p. 23). Working with the break-
downs of everyday patterns, rather than against them, is 
central to ontological design. In this case the ‘domains of 
anticipation’ within a community are clearly revealed by 
Figure 1. An ‘attack tree’, generated automatically by ADTool on TREsPASS. This is a relatively simple demonstration example, while others may run into the 
hundreds of ‘branches’ and ‘leaves’. The goal of the attacker is at the top of the tree: ‘breaking and entering’.
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failures occurring within the particular space of ‘possible 
breakdowns’ afforded by those domains (Winograd and 
Flores, 1986, p. 69). For the purposes of gaining insight into 
how a community conceives of and designs itself, Winograd 
and Flores, as well as Escobar, insist that ‘a breakdown is 
not something negative’ (Escobar, 2012, p. 38). 
Methods: creative security engagement 
Creative security engagements are founded on four 
principles: they are playful, participative, open-ended and 
democratic (Dunphy et al., 2014). Moreover, they are de-
signed to support and structure conversations about dig-
ital security, and to function as a vehicle to bring the per-
spectives of communities to different organisations and to 
government (Heath and Coles-Kemp, 2017). This includes 
any relevant tacit or previously unshared knowledge that 
stakeholders may possess, ensuring that their perspective 
is clearly identified and sufficiently built into any later work. 
Our methods contrast with but can also be used, if desired, 
in conjunction with other more structured and conventional 
approaches such as interviews, focus groups, and ques-
tionnaires. In contrast to the method described below, the 
official ‘LEGO Serious Play’ methodology is highly struc-
tured and requires participants to work individually at the 
outset, after which shared group work takes place (Cantoni 
et al., 2011). Variants of the methodology have been used in 
organisational strategic planning, and in gathering require-
ments for design more generally (Bürgi and Roos, 2003; 
Roos et al., 2004; Schulz and Geithner, 2011).
Research rationale
Our engagement method creates safe spaces where 
people can share their matters of concern, air differences 
without hindrance or fear of consequences, and has been 
evolved through trial and error and with participant feed-
back. Creative security methods encourage people to reflect 
on their environment, the emotions they feel, the constraints 
they experience, the pressures that they undergo as well as 
the actions and the tasks that they perform when generating 
and sharing information. The methods encourage the use of 
colour, imagery, shapes, textures and sound as well as text 
to reflect upon and articulate the situations in which infor-
mation is generated and shared. By encouraging this broad-
er type of thinking, security issues are also articulated from 
the perspectives of different groups within a context. The 
method seeks to identify how groups currently respond to 
those issues, enabling digital and other security strategies to 
be developed that respond to these wider issues while pro-
moting and working with the strengths of the groups. 
In the context of information security, physical mod-
elling occupies a space between the typical diagrams 
(flow-charts and UML diagrams for example) that security 
practitioners commonly work with, and the everyday prac-
tices of those who are affected by security design. LEGO 
in particular provides a physical method where modularity 
and connectivity bridges this space very effectively. LEGO 
models become richly decorated with mini-figures, anno-
tations, connections of different kinds between elements, 
and fantastical structures, evocative of security in the ev-
eryday for our participants. We see this as an extension 
and a democratisation of the traditional risk assessment 
process, enabling fundamental questions to be addressed 
by participants, such as ‘whose security are we talking 
about?’ The conversation around these questions is moved 
forward by participation in (and through) the joint modelling 
process described below.
Research methodology 
The research methodology is as follows:  
(1) Session structure and presentation. Pre-meet-
ing and briefing sessions are followed by one or more 
initial hands-on sessions in which different materials are 
used with the group to advance the discussion of the 
core concerns and values of the group. These sessions 
test the appropriateness of different materials. Partic-
ipatory diagramming (Figure 2) and modelling using a 
variety of materials (Figure 3) are introduced, familiaris-
ing the group with the process of working through their 
concerns using shared means. This also identifies the 
values that can be looked at together during later stages 
of the engagement process.
During this first phase, participants have the oppor-
tunity to make joint diagrams on paper, demarcating par-
ticular areas and questions to be addressed in the subse-
quent physical modelling. Our introductory remarks often 
ask participants to respond to a design provocation as a 
starting point for the diagramming discussions. After this 
narrowing down of interest onto specific topics and ques-
tions, we ask participants to divide themselves into sub-
groups of between three and six people, and invite them to 
consider the particular scenario they have in mind in more 
detail. LEGO kits are provided to them, including grey LEGO 
base-boards to build upon. An optional colour code to use 
with the bricks is supplied (Figure 4). The colour scheme 
for this is: data (blue bricks); infrastructure (green); and ac-
tors (yellow). This colour scheme is loosely based upon a 
schema developed by the Open Group for graphically mod-
elling business enterprises (the Archimate tool, Lankhorst 
et al., 2009). The groups are encouraged to develop their 
own schemas on the back of this, or in entirely new ways, 
to assist in modelling the kind of situations they intend to 
look at. 
The physical modelling session is structured by al-
locating different roles to group members. Each group is 
self-facilitating to a great extent. Participants volunteer for 
suggested roles: (1) the scribe, who annotates and doc-
uments the group discussions and the rationale behind 
particular modelling decisions; and (2) the narrator, who 
towards the end of the session presents the narrative of 
the model to the wider group. The scribe can also use an 
open source online app that we have designed for the pur-
pose of summarising models graphically (InterActor, 2018). 
Participants are not asked to diagram and model all of the 
possible dimensions of a given scenario. Only the most sa-
lient features are modelled, that is, those considered to be 
the most relevant by the groups themselves. If applicable, 
the groups are able to envisage not only how things are in 
a present scenario, but how they could be imagined in a 
desired future state of affairs. 
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An overview and synopsis phase follows the mod-
el-building. Each of the groups takes a turn to make a short 
presentation of the information-sharing and protection 
narratives that emerged when making their model. This is 
an opportunity for participants to re-examine their self-de-
fined starting questions. After this, and towards the very 
end of the session, groups are invited to merge all of the 
models from the different groups, arranging them in such 
a way that the separate narratives are able to resonate 
with one another. This allows for participants to gain a new 
perspective on their work: the generally consistent format 
of the models, plus the common starting points, serves to 
highlight the connections and differences between the out-
puts of the different groups.
(2) Data gathering. Initially, a selection of materials 
is provided to participants, including pens and large pa-
per sheets, with which they can map their first response 
to a provocation. After a short time, the LEGO kit is given 
to them, which also includes a number of small blank 
cards and pens, with which to annotate their models. 
This is as well as adhesive tapes, strings, and other 
means of augmenting the models. Sessions are audio- 
and video-recorded, and photographs are made of the 
diagrams, the LEGO models, and each group’s notes. 
This documentation also includes the verbal presenta-
tion of the model to other groups, and the merging and 
overview segment of the session. 
(3) Data analysis. An open source audiovisual tran-
scription package is used to create an annotated tran-
script of participant speech, and to map this to physical 
spaces in the models (ELAN, 2017; Figure 5). In parallel 
with this, and in order to overcome the difficulty partici-
pants might have in reworking their constructions in the 
time available, digital collages are made of the LEGO 
models (Figure 7). This preserves the appearance and 
desired spatial relationships between the built items, but 
separates the flows of information and actor relation-
ships, so that the overall pattern may be seen more eas-
ily. A list of ranked keywords is then generated through a 
corpus analysis of the transcript (AntConc, 2013). Pos-
itive or negative keywords are extracted from this (us-
ing the Brown corpus as reference). This shorter list of 
positive and negative keywords is then cross-referenced 
with the physical points of the LEGO model referred to 
by speech. By linking keywords to the spaces and places 
of the model, a heat map view of the scenario can be 
created (Figure 8). This maps out the key topics con-
nected to the security and wellbeing of the community 
being modelled.
(4) Reporting. In a post-event report the separate and 
combined group narratives are represented concisely, and 
this includes photographs, sometimes taken by the group 
members themselves. This report is shared with the group 
by email, or in paper form, as soon after the session as 
possible. Any feedback that is received from the group on 
this, is then incorporated into a final version of the report 
for sharing with the relevant stakeholders and beyond, if 
the engagement requires.
Figure 2. Initial sessions use shared diagramming to map out the prime areas of responsibility and concern for different participants. These outputs are later 
fed back to the group as a set of design principles, and as target graphs showing how their responsibilities and concerns map onto each other.
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Results
This case study, with a small London-based social 
enterprise, looked at how a new home-banking service 
for people in local communities on low incomes could 
be launched using an internet protocol television (IPTV) 
infrastructure in their homes. Our aim was to help the 
different stakeholders involved in the design, provision 
and use of the service to discuss whether there might 
be other ways to define the service. The briefing for this 
case study established a motivating factor to provide 
access to banking for older members of communities 
who distrust online transactions, and who may not own 
computers or smart devices. 
Figure 3. Follow-up sessions employ a mix of materials to narrow the field of enquiry with regard to the groups’ developing projects. Here the target diagrams 
of core values and concerns are populated with various toy avatars, the distribution of which is cross-referenced with an enlarged hand-drawn technical 
diagram of the service as supplied by the group. 
Figure 4. The LEGO colour schema. This is provided to participants as a 
suggested way to encode the movement of shared information. Some 
groups go on to devise schemas of their own. 
Figure 5. The ELAN coding of the IPTV model. The annotations on some layers (or tiers) refer to conversational topics raised within the group. These were 
later used to generate graphical heat maps over the digitally collaged re-mapping of the original LEGO model.
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Our participants were members of the service design 
team who wished to scope the security of the service, pri-
or to running focus groups with users in the communities 
they served. They were initially shown box diagrams and 
flow charts representing the technical layout of the ser-
vice, but the participants failed to recognise themselves in 
these technical representations (despite having provided 
a number of these to us). Our discussions stalled due to 
the difficulty of relating these representations to their core 
business values and to the motivating vision of the staff 
and managers. After initial trials using mixed hand-drawn 
diagrams and toys for avatars (Figure 3), LEGO was intro-
duced with more successful outcomes. Six participants 
were able to model in LEGO the home of the typical service 
user, and to refine their understanding of how data should 
be allowed to enter and leave the home, as it flowed across 
the IPTV service (Figure 6). In a follow-up up session the 
same group discussed and refined the same model in con-
sultation with our team. They were able to shape the dif-
ferent protections required for the service to maintain its 
integrity and relevance for the communities in question. In 
terms of the instrumental requirements of security-design, 
the modelling process resulted in the following insights: 
(i)  The process enabled the participants to scope the 
implications of particular combinations of technol-
ogy, with a view to making it feel familiar to users 
(AMP smart plugs, televisions and remote controls). 
(ii)  Participants were able to specify the correct levels 
of encryption needed for financial data in move-
ment and at rest, at different points along the 
transaction pathway, and across the banking sys-
tem and cloud provider. This was discussed as a 
mix of data redaction, unique identifier codes, and 
encryption at different places in the model. 
(iii)  The group was able to clarify the organisational 
position that the client should own data emerg-
ing from use of the system, and worked through 
a number of ways in which the system architec-
ture design should support this. Participants were 
able to scope and test criteria for context-sensitive 
ring-fencing of different areas of the service, with 
business rules for defining what an alert is and at 
what level it can be declared. These might be alerts 
relating to overspending, unusual data patterns 
and energy use, in conjunction with local health 
and social services. Participant AM noted the sys-
tem should require that ‘to become an alert we 
have to notice the interest and concern of at least 
five different professionals in a particular family’; 
‘to protect people from false alerts’, and ‘so, trigger 
an intervention... [even though] you’re not sharing 
any user data.’ The modelling helped to clarify how 
to avoid the risk of data interception and modifica-
tion, tampering and other forms of unauthorised 
access. 
(iv)  Participants were able to specify that the system 
can accommodate carers and relatives being giv-
en permissioned access to the data under certain 
conditions and for certain purposes.
(v)  Participants were able to make plans for team de-
briefing after ‘human’ interventions (where a part-
ner organisation sends a trained worker to visit the 
family and enquire as to their wellbeing and iden-
tify why an overspend has occurred, for example). 
This precaution is especially necessary for the re-
moval of data ‘puddles’ left behind after releasing 
data following an alert that has been actioned in 
such a way. 
(vi)  It was also concluded that a new ‘Troubleshoot-
er’ role should be created to field specific data 
requests and manage how alerts are handled by 
the five service partners. Subsequently, new Ar-
chimate models were generated as a result of the 
above insights, and a digital collage of the model 
(Figure 7) was given as part of our feedback to the 
participants. Finally, a heat map of the positive and 
negative sentiment around the service was made 
using the methods described in the previous sec-
tion (Figure 8). 
Place-based modelling 
Aside from the instrumental or pragmatic outcomes 
mentioned above, how can our results be described in 
terms of the place-based modelling lens described in 
the Introduction? LEGO modelling is place-based in the 
sense that a localised ecology is created around a rec-
ognisable and tangible scenario derived from a commu-
nities’ everyday reality. Actors are naturally situated in a 
model amongst an array of other items (infrastructure, 
data, roles, and anything else they wish to incorporate). 
These actors then animate a complex and hybridised 
physical-digital space.
In the IPTV model, the home is differentiated by hav-
ing a relatively high degree of internal structure (Figure 9). 
Elements are built around the remote control and the tele-
vision, used by the tenant to manage her money. On either 
side are her two children. The television is very large in 
comparison, due to its stated prominence in the life of the 
family. The area around the television has been given a ring 
of green stem-like pieces that represent the homes’ active 
‘connectivity’ to the outside world – the access to informa-
tion provided via the television:
P1: wow! I have an idea
P1:  around the tv, we could design like a circle, which 
means that the whole world is concentrated for 
them in the tv
P1:  like the whole data and information comes 
through the tv
P2: huh!
P3: ok
P2: which it sort of does! [...]
P1: ohh, oh, now this is their world
P3:  this is interesting, that this is their world, like that, 
i-it could either be that, or, it could be a PC or 
whatever
P2: it could, yes
P3: as everyone has a PC, w-w- , as everyone has
P1: like in a circle like this
P2: and what is it?
P1: its, ...the world
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Figure 6. The IPTV service design LEGO model. Key: 0 = Service Provider; 1 = Client; 2 = Card; 3 = TV; 4 = Remote; 5 = Client’s sphere of interest; 6 = Antenna 
on TV; 7 = Antenna on Card; 8 = Data TV to Card; 9 = Boundary between Client and Service Provider; 10 = Data Remote to TV; 11 = Raspberry Pi; 12 = Cloud; 
13 = Data TV to Cloud; 14 = Protection on Cloud; 15 = Bank; 16 = Account; 17 = Security on Bank; 18 = Data Cloud to Service Provider; 19 = Data Service 
Provider to Partner 23; 20 = Children; 21 = Security on Remote; 22 = Data Bank to Cloud; 23 = Partner 23; 24 = Service Provider Data management; 25 = 
Service Provider Server; 26 = Partner 26; 27 = Intervention in progress; 28 = Intervention pathway; 29 = Partner 29; 30 = Staff at Partner 23; 31 = Staff at 
Service Provider; 32 = Partner HA; 33 = Partner 33; 34  = Partner 34; 35 = Partner 35; 36 = Energy provider; 37 = Data Bill to Client; 38= Governmental welfare 
agencies; 39 = Income source; 40 = Welfare benefits; 41 = Government systems; 42 = Additional cards; 43 = Partner bridges 1; 44 = Partner bridges 2; 45 = 
Troubleshooter; 46 = Data Troubleshooter to Partners; 47 = Carer. 
Figure 7. As part of our reporting to the participants, a digital collage was made from photographs of the original IPTV LEGO model. The elements of the model 
were grouped according to the functions and processes assigned to them by the group, aligning at specified points, to form an overview of the relational 
service design.
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Figure 8. The IPTV model collage has a heat map superimposed over it, based upon positive and negative keywords found in the recordings of the speech of 
participants. The size of the circular nodes denotes the number of mentions of this part of the collage, and increasing red colour denotes the frequency of 
negative keywords at this point in the model.
Data from the family then flows out into the service 
infrastructure more widely, looping over to the banking plat-
form and to the service provider partnership, via the cloud 
provider service. The modelling process is grounded in 
the construction of differentiated spaces and locations of 
the participants’ own devising, gradually building up a rep-
resentation of how the community sees itself within this 
scenario. The ring of green antennae are place-holders - for 
the core of the family’s activities in connection with this 
home-banking service. The green ring also sets this zone 
apart, marking it out as the safe space for the family. It can 
be argued that the green ring added to the home by the 
group is a tangible ‘field inscription’ of shared space (Heath, 
2014). This is a field constructed by the participants, which 
can be made visible with line drawings and is an analysis 
of shared space which can be supported by their speech 
(Heath et al., 2014). In this case the participants have used 
the green ring of LEGO to help delineate the qualitative as 
well as the logical limits of the home.
The separateness of the home, as compared to other 
locations, is clear when viewing the model from the van-
tage point of the home, as for example when the tall light-
green structure representing the government looms over 
the home from a distance away (Figure 10):
P1:  and this was my idea, this is their world, and this is 
the antenna because they get all the information, 
via TV
P3: it’s their whole world, that’s why the TV is so big
P1: and this is the door
P1: accessible from
P2:  I’ve got slightly worried about having said that this 
is their whole world, because I’m not convinced 
that that’s really fair, but
P3:  [unclear] 
Investigator: it’s their connection to, the whole world?
P2: yeah, it’s their door to the outside world
The group took great care to model the potential ef-
fects of its proposed IPTV service on clients, as described 
at the beginning of this section (effects that can be both 
intended and unintended). By working through the impli-
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cations of the user’s perspective and those of other ac-
tors - including that of the service partnership, of the bank, 
and of the government - they produced a new ‘horizon of 
understanding’, a hybrid of all of these perspectives and 
of their own as the service providers. These perspectives 
were then integrated into a revised approach to the design. 
This process centred on ensuring that unintended conse-
quences for the client would not compromise their ‘door 
to the outside world’, and destroy the credibility of the ser-
vice. Reflecting on the session afterwards, participant NK 
stated: ‘The best thing about this is that normally we have 
to try to somehow keep all of this in the mind, whereas 
this [process] allows us to see it all at once.’ This comment 
suggests that a strategically significant new view of the 
home and its’ relevant horizons had been gained through 
the participatory physical modelling process.
The speech accompanying the modelling reveals how 
the groups constructs different varieties of the ‘constitutive 
other’ (Staten, 1986). The abstracted and remote structures 
of the bank and government, which have a degree of inter-
nal differentiation based on known functionality of those in-
stitutions but little spatial differentiation, and are in marked 
contrast with the detailed ‘place’ which is the user’s home. 
For other actors such as attackers, about whom little is 
known due to their being truly ‘other’, no representations of 
infrastructure or data have been added to the model. These 
are dematerialized actors - with no physical presence on 
the board. The properties of potential attackers on the ser-
vice are discussed by participants in a fabulatory vein:
P1: Did you see the hacker, up there?
P4: yes, huh
P5:  no this is the hacker, and this is the dog trying to 
be security
P3:  hacker, no, that’s absolutely important, because 
hackers threaten absolutely everybody
P1:  because actually the hacker is not in [us], this is 
[us] isn’t it?
P3:  outside, yes 
Figure 9. The service user (with red hair at bottom left) is in her home. A 
carer is behind her, and her two children are immediately in front of her. In 
front of them is the remote control with an avatar representing the security 
controls on the remote. Small blue data bricks flow out from the remote 
towards the large yellow television (via a ‘Raspberry Pi’ chip with stack 
of blue data and pink controls). The diagonal line of blue data with red 
alerts placed on them represents the arrival of a large payment demand 
from a utility company, which sparks the overspending of the client and 
leads to a soft intervention visit from a specialised partner worker. The area 
around the television was given a ring of small green plant-like pieces that 
represented the homes’ active ‘connectivity’ to the outside world.
P1:  but the hackers are everywhere, y’know, by defi-
nition
P4: they’re flying, huhah over, huh huh
P1: but then it looks like, haha, Santa Claus
P1: it flies, the hacker flies!
The group also debated how to represent the high 
street bank holding the customer’s data and controlling 
the release of her funds. It is a green and blue towered 
construct, with a figure on top wearing a white helmet and 
brandishing a long weapon-like implement (Figure 11). 
Reversing conventional expectations, the bank takes on 
the appearance of an adversary, revealing it to be a poten-
tial area of agonistic interaction for the user of the IPTV 
service. If not managed effectively, the bank’s communi-
cations with the service provider partnership - including 
alerts raised by the client overspending - could impact on 
the clients’ rented housing situation and their access to 
government benefits:
P3: I’m going to put
P3: Visa, American Express thing on there
P3:  and then we need to put the customer account on 
there don’t we
Figure 10. The actors in the home, the parent (user) and carer (with brown 
hair) face towards the children and television (out of shot at right). To one 
side and not in their immediate vision is the tall green tower representing 
the government, with a witch-hatted figure aloft, and green ‘tentacles’ 
spreading outwards. A dog is suspended there to suggest the possibility of 
teeth, of being bitten by government. Blue data is piled at the towers’ base, 
and a trickle of intermixed blue data and gold coins (money) moves towards 
the home. The square block of blue which is the energy payment demand is 
encroaching into the home space. 
Claude P. R. Heath, Peter A. Hall, Lizzie Coles-Kemp75
Strategic Design Research Journal, volume 11, number 2, May-August 2018
P3:  this is the huge bank at the heart of the economy
P2: and also, it’s, it’s quite threatening
P6:  I think that should be lower, haha, it’s too, it’s 
too, imposing
By constructing actors with differing degrees of 
closeness to the home and differing degrees of threat to 
the home, the participants were able to track a number of 
the possible intended and unintended consequences of 
the service design. It is noteworthy that the participants 
preferred to track the performance of the service through 
this kind of relationship, rather than via any relationship 
to an attacker. There were different roles to be played by 
adversaries and by the more supportive actors - the latter 
primarily relates to actors such as the service partnership, 
who see themselves as being there ‘to stop small problems 
becoming big ones’ for their users. At a briefing meeting, 
staff described their vision of themselves as a social enter-
prise and ‘a trusted data aggregator’, saying that ‘banking 
should look like social networking’. They wished to deploy a 
system ‘where data is only exploited for the benefit of those 
who own it’, that is, the users. This is in contrast to the at-
tacker described above, an actor that does not share any 
common ground with any of the other actors in the model, 
contested or otherwise. The attacker is a fully fledged (if 
also dematerialised) antagonist as opposed to an adver-
sary with whom there is some common ground.
Having seen how place and actors have been con-
structed in shared modelling using LEGO, we can now turn 
our attention to the ability of this method to depict recurring 
and abstracted patterns running through the models. This 
specifically relates to how human practices are mapped 
onto different places within models using concepts of time 
and space. The group consider the scenario previously 
mentioned, where the user is made homeless through an 
unintended consequence of data management, and they 
run this through the different facets of their model in order 
to see how this might unfold. The participants discussed 
how this outcome could be avoided:
P2:  you know, how you, I hadn’t really thought about 
that as a collaborative early warning system
P2:  person could become homeless and wouldn’t 
have a [bank] card either
P3:  we’re talking about fraud, abuse, loss of the card, 
abuse from within the family
P2:  it can still happen, so what happens here if that 
happens?
P3:  who is then responsible?
P2:  will there be
P2:  trigger, action, which can put in place all of the ser-
vices which are nothing to do with us
P3:  it’s the early intervention that people want, the 
alerts [...]
P2: troubleshooter
P2:  but that’s an interesting point, we have an Account 
meeting on Monday, so I think I’ll raise it
The group finds that an extreme but possible break-
down scenario reveals the need for a new ‘Troubleshooter’ 
role to be created, whose purpose is to manage the way in 
which that data is handled across the service. In creating a 
new business role the group has effected a change in the 
proposed design, and it has also evolved a new domain of 
anticipation with which to envisage further ‘spaces of possi-
ble breakdown’, (as Winograd and Flores call them), all over 
again. Far from being a problem, this is seen as a positive 
outcome from the modelling process, as it advances the de-
sign to a new level of insight. There has been a reshaping of 
the horizon embedded in the model, and the reflexive inter-
Figure 11. Left: the representation of the government- see previous image for full description. Right: the ‘imposing’ banking platform, with figure on top 
representing the security and controls within the banks sphere, demarcated by a rectangle made of pink tiles, as per the colour schema for location’ provided 
to participants.
Holding on to dissensus: Participatory interactions in security design76
Strategic Design Research Journal, volume 11, number 2, May-August 2018
action with the model requires changes to be made in the 
elements they have previously built. The group has arrived 
at a new interpretation of the possible spatial and temporal 
patterns of the model, and this shows how LEGO can suc-
cessfully be used to manage the interconnectedness and 
changeability of place and horizon within a scenario. 
Discussion 
Having examined our results through the lens of 
place-based modelling we can now see the need to nu-
ance our understanding of how these models function for 
the communities that generate them. The modelling en-
gagement discussed here, and many others like it that we 
have conducted in multiple cases studies, are endowed 
with undoubtedly rich and unpredictable topologies. Many 
of the model elements have their own internal structure, 
and actors have horizons that can be subject to change. 
Actors can be constituted as being inside a central sphere 
of interest or outside this, characterised as ‘other’. Within 
complex and shifting ecologies such as these, a ‘door to 
the outside world’ (Figure 9) represents more than sim-
ply ‘common ground’ over which actors can move. The 
LEGO models are far from being simple shared spaces, 
but display an array of shape-shifting and place-based 
modelling strategies.
Beyond this visible ecology of place and the struc-
tures that form them, there are other questions prompted 
by what is not visible. When considering which things are 
not depicted in the model, even though they may be refer-
enced in the discussions of participants, we can ask why 
are they not modelled directly, and how this impacts on 
implicit ‘horizons of understanding’ and spaces of possible 
breakdown in the model. We saw in the IPTV model how 
dematerialised antagonists (‘hackers’) hover unseen over 
the model (and these are comically likened to Santa Claus). 
The many other ways in which the home is constructed as 
a situated place in the IPTV model automatically raises the 
issue of the home as a domain of anticipation and possi-
ble breakdown. Creative security methods highlight the 
fact that, as Winograd and Flores say, ‘We are engaged in 
an activity of interpretation that creates both possibilities 
and blindness’ (1986, p. 178). This is a blindness produced 
by an extended process of engagement and involvement 
with a community: ‘Our view is limited to what can be ex-
pressed in the terms we have adopted. This is not a flaw to 
be avoided in thinking - on the contrary, it necessary and in-
escapable’ (p. 97). The three points of interest introduced at 
the outset help researchers to work creatively with a com-
munity to see and work creatively with these necessary 
possibilities and blindnesses. The place-based ontologies 
of the group were visualised in the heat map of the IPTV 
model (Figure 8). Many other kinds of observations could 
be mapped onto their ontology in the same way - reversals 
of perspective, changes in horizons, spaces of potential 
breakdown, for example.
The IPTV participants depicted in their model how 
networks of resilience could be built up in the community 
with ‘soft’ human interventions - the knock on the door by 
a friendly advisor. The model demonstrates a principle of 
pluralistic democracy that, as Mouffe says, ‘to construct 
the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as 
an enemy to be destroyed, but an “adversary”’, and that ‘an 
adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with 
whom we have some common ground’ (Mouffe, 2000, 
p. 15), and that ‘the opponent should be considered not as 
an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose ex-
istence is legitimate and must be tolerated’ (Mouffe, 1993, 
p. 4). The model also demonstrates how ‘there can only be 
an identity when it is constructed as difference and that 
any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power’ 
(Mouffe, 2009, p. 550). This is much as we have seen in 
the cases of the hacker and the bank and government. The 
modelling process appears to help participants to establish 
what the ‘homeomorphic’ or functional equivalents of any 
given concept are for a particular community (Panikkar, 
1982, p. 81-82). In this case, the spoken of but unseen San-
ta Claus figure, not tied to any particular place or location 
but floating above these, becomes the equivalent to the no-
tion of an external and dissociated antagonist. 
Conclusion
An extensive process of engagement requires a lev-
el of experimentation and of dwelling with a community 
around the matters that concern them, as Escobar says. 
In this way, the above questions can be identified and 
pushed further, asking ‘Why?’ at each stage. This pushes 
at the edges of the spaces of possible breakdown, simul-
taneously narrowing down and extending the open-ended 
discussion of how a community constitutes and designs 
itself over a particular place, space and time. As Escobar 
notes, this process of developing an open-ended enqui-
ry may require dwelling on a ‘disharmony’ presented by 
participants, but as the excerpts from our modelling inter-
actions show, creative security methods dwell on dishar-
mony by facilitating a playful ‘space of confrontation’ or 
agonistic contestation. The methods we have described, 
although viable as they are, could be extended into other 
forms of engagement suitable for working with a greater 
range of cultures and perspectives. The current method 
requires groups of participants to summarise their mod-
els for other groups (in engagements with larger numbers 
of people). This provides the basis for a ‘conflictual con-
sensus’ or ‘dissensus’ to become the norm for the way 
that our engagements are framed. As Mouffe says, the 
notion of a community converging ‘on one single model’ 
without a considered view of how to take account of dif-
fering political interpretations runs counter to agonistic 
pluralism (Mouffe, 2009, p. 552). Extending the method 
and also the way it is framed would also be an opportunity 
to look at how public space is ‘striated’ in different ways 
for different people. As it stands, the method can absorb 
further aspects of ‘critical making’ - where there is a ‘po-
liticization of the artifact through the process of defining 
function and form’ (DiSalvo, 2014, p. 97). This is of course 
a continuing process of evolving methods. The analysis of 
participatory data given here, is we hope a step towards 
resolving an outstanding issue: ‘we are still in need of de-
scriptive and analytic methods for making sense of and 
communicating the meaning and consequence of these 
endeavors’ (DiSalvo, 2014, p. 104).
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Processes of change are discussed in the context of 
the problematics of participatory design research by Ke-
shavarz and Mazé, who foreground the contention that 
consensus cannot be reconciled with change, particularly 
where oppressive norms are in place (Keshavarz and Mazé, 
2013, p. 9). Rather than achieving change through the rhet-
oric of consensus, the authors consider Mouffe’s concept 
of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (Mouffe, 2009) and Rancière’s ‘dis-
sensus’ in order to allow for the ‘presentation of conflicts 
between interest, opinions and ideas’ within participatory 
design (Keshavarz and Mazé, 2013, p. 11). This is achieved 
by framing research as ‘in-disciplinary’ as opposed to inter-
disciplinary, so that no one imposes their ‘voice, knowledge 
or discipline on the shared space of action/reaction’ (Kes-
havarz and Mazé, 2013, p. 17).
Given the dominance of technical approaches to se-
curity and the tendency of the security industry to want to 
maximise profit from risk management business opportu-
nities (Amoore, 2014, p. 6), it is difficult to imagine a shared 
space in information security in which the disciplinary ex-
pertise of security practitioners is not imposed. However, in 
prototyping the agonistic but creative approach described 
here, we have made some initial steps towards understand-
ing and practicing security while using the terms, horizons, 
and ontologies of participants - rather than of security pro-
fessionals. Our approach is to draw out of participants the 
relationships, practices, knowledges and associated ways 
of being that can be developed upon in order for a commu-
nity to build up its strength and resilience, including rela-
tionships of trust. Creative security engagements seek to 
unseat a dominant model and disciplinary discourse with 
new understandings of security that are less hierarchical 
than current dominant approaches that have been condi-
tioned by technical security alone.
Agonistic spaces of interaction have great transfor-
mative potential, and can capture the richer experiential, 
dimensional and agonistic picture. By asking fundamen-
tal questions during engagements such as ‘Security for 
whom?’, a space is opened up in which ‘claims and voices 
of marginal actors can grow stronger’ (Hillgren et al., 2016, 
p. 97). Not discussed here are the potential benefits that 
creative security methods can have in determining what it 
means for a community to have collective wellbeing, or Vi-
vir Bien (Escobar, 2012, p. 49). Our approach augments the 
notion of ‘positive security’, an enabling a collectivity with 
the freedom to - to pursue and exercise rights, and to follow 
matters of concern and interest (McSweeney, 1999). This 
is contrasted with negative conceptions of security, which 
are centred on prevention of threat - freedom from. The po-
tentially transformative power of our approach is to bring to 
this a participatory dimension that constructs breakdowns 
as a way ‘to identify the affirmative dimension of contes-
tation’ and of agonism (Honig, 1993, p. 15). This rests in 
bringing forward a ‘multiplicity of voices’ as Mouffe says, 
and the possibility of accepting a new paradigm on the 
basis of this, leading to ‘a sort of conversion’ through hav-
ing seen it being made visible and manifest (Mouffe, 1993, 
p. 17). Beyond this, place-based modelling is also able to 
represent how the ontological security of actors is repro-
duced through routines carried out recursively and recipro-
cally across space and time. As Giddens says, ‘routinization 
is vital to the psychological mechanisms whereby a sense 
of trust or ontological security in the daily activities of so-
cial life’ is gained (Giddens, 1984, p. xxiii).
The Wannacry ransomware attack, discussed at the 
beginning of this paper, caused the widespread inability of 
NHS staff to carry on their daily functions, such as knowing 
which patients are booked for appointments and when they 
are due to arrive. Everyday routines and practices being dis-
rupted in this way means that the attention of staff is drawn 
into managing the apparatus of communication itself, into 
its ‘unreadiness-to-hand’, or breakdown. This can help us 
to look more closely at the things that breakdown reveals, 
and help prevent, minimise and repair the damage caused 
by such attacks - attacks on trust and human security (as 
opposed to technical security). The creative security en-
gagement method we have outlined here is concerned with 
showing how security effects everyone, and with democra-
tising the process of designing securities with and for com-
munities. The impact of the approach can perhaps best be 
measured in terms of how the conversation about security 
is conducted. This can be a rich agonistic dialogue between 
communities, permitting more than one understanding of 
security. This, in and of itself, strengthens security since 
it moves participants beyond a necessarily impoverished 
monocultural concept of security.
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